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occurs by inducing labor market entry in families that initially do not have an adult in the workforce.
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  The United States has in recent years relied on three types of policies to boost the incomes 
of poor families: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the minimum wage, and welfare. 
Although welfare acts directly to provide income to many of the neediest families, and thus is 
perhaps the most immediate means of assisting the poor, concerns have been raised about the 
potential for longer-term dependency associated with pure income-support programs.  Given 
these concerns, the principal attraction of both the EITC and the minimum wage is that they are 
intended to raise the earned income of the poor, a goal which is generally viewed as more 
desirable than making direct transfer payments to low-income families.  However, most empirical 
research has focused on the impacts of the EITC and the minimum wage on other labor market 
behaviors−such as labor supply or labor demand−which although obviously related, provide only 
part of the overall picture.
1  The extensive body of research on the effects of the minimum wage 
on the employment outcomes of youths is, of course, well known.  But, even with respect to the 
EITC, where the bulk of the literature is quite recent, previous studies have focused primarily on 
the effects of the program on labor force participation and hours worked for particular subgroups 
of the population (such as single mothers with children), rather than on the overall distributive 
effects among families participating in the program. 
  Moreover, those few studies that do examine the effects of the EITC (or the minimum 
wage) on family incomes have relied mainly on simulation methods to reach their conclusions, 
rather than on direct empirical estimates.  Such studies, which tend to take parameter values from 
the empirical literature, might be adequate if there was a general consensus about the effects of 
these programs on labor market behavior.  However, because much of the literature studying the 
behavioral influences of anti-poverty policies is contentious (e.g., the recent debate over the 
employment effects of minimum wages), the simulation results are likely to be viewed 2 
skeptically, especially by those with an alternative point of view regarding the assumptions 
underlying the simulation.  
In this paper, we examine the empirical link between the EITC and earned pre-tax income 
using panel data on poor and low-income families that are the EITC’s intended beneficiaries. 
Using data on federal and state parameters of the EITC program, we estimate the effects of the 
EITC on earned incomes of poor families and on transitions of families into and out of poverty.  
While the main contribution of the paper is this new evidence on the EITC, we also provide some 
contrasts with the effects of minimum wages on family incomes, building on some of our earlier 
work (Neumark, et al., 1998).  
Although very much a reduced-form approach, the resulting estimates of the effects of 
these two alternative policies on earned income have three major advantages over the estimates 
from previous studies.  First, our procedure allows the data to speak directly to the question of the 
efficacy of using either the EITC or the minimum wage as a redistributive tool, and circumvents 
the need to choose point estimates for behavioral parameters.  Second, we can control for other 
influences on family income changes (including the EITC or the minimum wage) that might bias 
estimates based on parameter values from studies focusing solely on one or the other policies.  
Third, by examining both federal and state policy, we are able to use several types of variation in 
the data to help identify the effects on income. 
Our results indicate that there are differences in how the EITC and minimum wage policy 
affect earnings.  Both policies appear to have positive income effects on poor families with 
children.  However, the EITC effects are larger, evaluated on the basis of the average policy 
changes of the past 15 years.  Complementary evidence on employment and hours effects 
indicates that the benefits of the EITC come about mainly by inducing labor market entry for poor 
families without any adult workers in the year prior to the change in the EITC.  On net, these 3 
results suggest that the EITC is the more effective anti-poverty tool, especially if one considers 
positive work incentives as a goal of anti-poverty programs.  
By using pre-tax (and therefore pre-EITC) earnings rather than total income, we obviously 
ignore an important component of the redistributive effects of the EITC.  In this respect, our 
estimates provide a very conservative test of the benefits of the EITC relative to the minimum 
wage.  We choose to focus on pre-tax earnings for two reasons.  First, it permits a direct 
comparison of our estimates for earnings with our complementary estimates of labor supply 
effects; the fact that we find consistent results in both sets of estimates increases our confidence 
that the income effects that we are estimating are related to the EITC.  Second, in much of the 
discussion of potential anti-poverty policies, there is a stated preference for policies that 
encourage work and longer-run economic self-sufficiency; witness, for example, the recent 
emphasis on welfare reform and empowerment.  The EITC is frequently praised along these same 
lines, reflecting an assumption that the credit encourages families to work more.  Our aim is to 
provide some additional evidence with which to assess the accuracy of these claims, by looking at 
the EITC’s effects on families’ earned income.   
Nevertheless, we should stress that because we use pre-tax earnings, our estimates imply an 
even greater effectiveness of the EITC in raising the income levels of poor families than is 
suggested by a literal reading of the coefficients in our family earnings equations.  Either way, 
however, our results confirm the sense provided by previous simulation studies of the EITC and 
minimum wage that the former is the more effective policy for fighting poverty.
2  
Previous Research 
Research on the EITC is quite sparse as compared with that on other anti-poverty 
programs, although the quantity of research in this area is growing rapidly.  In large part, this is 
because the EITC is a relatively recent policy initiative.  Although it was first implemented in 
1975, the EITC was considered a relatively unimportant component of welfare policy until it was 4 
expanded sharply as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, effective in 1987; additional EITC 
expansions took place in each year from 1991 to 1996.  Moreover, as noted above, most of the 
research thus far has focused on estimating behavioral responses for particular subgroups of the 
population rather than on evaluating the net effects of the program for the poor. 
In earlier papers, such estimates were typically derived from simulations based on 
parameters taken from the negative income tax literature or from more general studies of labor 
supply (Hoffman and Seidman, 1990; Dickert, et al., 1995).  More recently, Eissa and Liebman 
(1996) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a and 1999b) have directly estimated the effects of the 
EITC on the labor supply of single women with children.  Both papers find that the expansion of 
the EITC raised work activity among this group.  In contrast, Eissa and Hoynes (1998) compute 
similar estimates for married couples and find that the EITC had a small positive effect on the 
labor supply of married men, but a large negative effect on married women, with the net result 
being a decline in family labor supply.  
Comparisons of the EITC and minimum wage policy have also been conducted using a 
simulation approach.  The best known study in this area is by Burkhauser, et al. (1996), who 
evaluate how well the minimum wage targets the poor and compare the amount of additional 
income received by such families with what would be provided by the EITC.  The paper 
concludes that the 1990 and 1991 minimum wage increases stemming from the 1989 
Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act benefited upper income families (income-to-needs 
over 3) more than poor families, because many minimum wage workers are in higher-income 
families.  In contrast, the increases in the EITC between 1989 and 1992 went nearly exclusively  
to poor and near-poor families with children.  However, these simulations ignore both labor 
supply effects of the EITC and labor demand effects of minimum wages.  While informative 
about the targeting of benefits, they are unlikely to be definitive about the ultimate effects of the 
alternative policies on income. 5 
Data 
  To conduct the analysis, we use data at the family level drawn from the March CPS annual 
demographic files for the years 1986 through 1995.
3  As each family is potentially in the March 
sample for two consecutive years, we attempt to match records across years in order to observe 
changes in income during the period of our sample.  Overall, the match rates were above 80 
percent, although families with younger heads and lower income-to-needs ratios were somewhat 
less likely to be successfully matched.
4 
   For each family that could be matched across years, we extracted data on the amount and 
composition of family income, family size, and state of residence, as well as other variables 
introduced below.  The income and family size data are then used to calculate an income-to-needs 
ratio for each family, based on the official poverty line for a given family size in each year.  Note 
that the income data in the March CPS refer to the previous year, so that our sample period 
actually corresponds to the years 1985 to 1994.   
  To each of these family-year records, we appended the relevant data for the key parameters 
of the EITC program and the prevailing minimum wage in effect for the year in which the income 
data are reported.  For the minimum wage, we used the higher of the federal or state minimum 
wage for each state and year, following existing practice in the minimum wage literature.  For the 
EITC, we collected information on various parameters of the federal program applicable to each 
family based on the number of dependent children residing in the family; these parameters 
include the phase-in rate of the credit, the maximum income level to which the phase-in rate is 
applied, the income level at which the credit begins to be phased out, and the phase-out rate.  In 
the empirical analysis, we use the phase-in rate as the primary measure of the generosity of the 
EITC.
5  The phase-in rate and the maximum credit are reported for the federal program in the first 
six columns of Table 1.  The phase-in rate varies from zero prior to 1993 for families with no 
children to 30 percent in 1994 for families with two or more children; the maximum credit ranged 6 
from 0 to more than $2,500 over the same period.  In addition, there are currently 10 states that 
offer an EITC to low-income families.  These state credits are, for the most part, defined as a 
simple percentage of the federal credit received by the family, and range from less than five 
percent to more than 60 percent, depending on the state, year, and number of children (Table 1).  
Finally, while the federal program provides for a refundable credit, certain states offer only a non-
refundable credit, and in some specifications we exclude these states from the sample or try to 
make credit rates comparable in the two types of states.    
In addition, in some specifications we include controls for business cycle conditions and 
for the presence of other changes in welfare programs.  For the former, we use the unemployment 
rate for prime-age males in each state and year.  For the latter, we use the maximum level of 
AFDC benefits (in real terms) available to a family of three, along with a variable measuring the 
fraction of months in each year for which a state received a waiver from federal AFDC 
requirements.
6   
Empirical Estimates 
Our empirical strategy is to employ a specification that can be applied directly both to an 
analysis of the effects of the EITC on income-to-needs and to an analysis of the effects of a 
minimum wage policy.  Partly for this reason, we chose a reduced-form specification that limits 
the number of explanatory variables to exclude those that might be considered endogenous to 
these specific policies.  In addition, we estimate some specifications using income-to-needs 
categories to construct the dependent variable, and some using income-to-needs directly.  In the 
former case, the dependent variable is defined as the probability that a family moves from having 
an earned income-to-needs ratio (I/N) in the X1 to Y1 range in year one to a ratio in the X2 to Y2 
range in year two.  Using a linear probability model, this specification can be expressed as: 
I{X2<(I/N)2<Y2 | X1<(I/N)1<Y1}ist = α + Pistβ + γ∆Ust + Zistπ + δs + λt + εist  ,   (1)   7 
where I{…} is an indicator variable for the specified outcome, ‘i’ indexes families, ‘s’ states, and 
‘t’ years.  Pist is the policy under consideration (e.g., the state and/or federal EITC, or the real 
minimum wage).
7  ∆Ust is the change in the adult male unemployment rate, which we include to 
capture different patterns of changes in economic conditions across states; these could generate 
spurious results if, for example, good economic conditions positively impact poor families, and 
also lead to more generous state EITCs as a result of budget surpluses.  Zist is a vector of other 
control variables, δs is a vector of state indicators, and λt is a vector of year indicators.  The state 
indicators capture persistent differences across states in transition rates, for example different 
trends in poverty.  The year indicators capture aggregate changes in transition rates that may be 
driven by other factors, including other policy changes at the national level.   
The parameter β is of particular interest in this study as it provides an estimate of the effect 
of the policy variable on the transition rates or changes in income-to-needs.  For example, if the 
policy variable is the change in the EITC credit rate and X1, X2, Y1, and Y2 are defined to 
measure the transition rate out of poverty, then β would tell us whether an increase in the credit 
rate results in an increase in the probability of families leaving poverty.  Given that the state and 
year terms soak up some of the variation in the data—including some of that in the EITC 
variables, it is useful to point out how the estimates of policy effects are identified.  In particular, 
the inclusion of the year indicators implies that the effect of the federal EITC is identified from 
variation in EITC parameters across families with different numbers of children.  The inclusion of 
the state indicators implies that the effect of state EITCs is identified from within-state variation 
in EITC parameters.
8  We also include controls for the number of children under 18 (defined 
using separate indicator variables for families with one child, two children, and three or more 
children).  In some specifications we interact these children indicators with the year dummy 
variables to account for other sources of change in family incomes that might differentially affect 8 
families with different numbers of children.  When we do this, the effect of the federal EITC is no 
longer identified, since this varies only with year and number of children.    
After looking at the evidence on the effects of the EITC on transitions into and out of 
poverty (in terms of earned income), we use similar specifications to examine the effects of 
changes in the EITC on income-to-needs ratios of poor families.  In particular, we estimate 
specifications of the form: 
{(I/N)2−(I/N)1}ist = α + Pistβ + γ∆Ust + Zistπ + δs + λt + εist  ,        (2)   
for the change in income-to-needs ratios among families with earnings below the poverty line in 
year one.  Finally, in some specifications we examine the direct influence of the policy variables 
on employment transitions or on changes in hours worked in an attempt to identify the channels 
through which the EITC affects income-to-needs.  
  Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for the basic data used in the analysis.  
The first column shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of matched families in the CPS.  
Mean earned income is above $30 thousand per year in our sample, and the average income-to-
needs ratio is a bit above 3.  However, 23 percent of families in our sample have an earned 
income-to-needs ratio below one, and another 8 percent are between one and 1.5.  These poor and 
near-poor families are the intended targets of both the EITC and the minimum wage, and we 
would expect families with much higher income-to-needs ratios to be unaffected by the EITC.  
For this reason, we restrict the sample in the subsequent analysis to include only those families 
with an income-to-needs ratio between 0 and 3 in the first year they are in the sample.  When the 
higher income families are dropped from the sample (column 2), mean earned income falls to less 
than $13 thousand and the average earned income-to-needs ratio is only slightly above one.  In 
addition, nearly half of the families in this subsample have an earned income-to-needs ratio below 
one and about 60 percent are below 1.5.  About 55 percent have children below age 18, which for 
most of the sample period is necessary to be eligible for the EITC.  9 
The EITC is targeted at families with children under age 18, and thus in many 
specifications, we further restrict the sample to such families.
9  Note that this choice, coupled 
with the information we have on state EITC supplements, leads to a different control group than 
that used by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (1998) in their studies of the 
federal EITC.  In particular, those studies typically identify families most likely to be eligible for 
the EITC and compare the labor supply response in those families to the changes in labor supply 
in families not eligible for the EITC, such as those without children.  In contrast, our estimation 
procedure makes use of state variation in the EITC across families with the same number of 
children to identify EITC effects on earned income, which, as we show below, often leads to 
quite different estimates.  Descriptive statistics for this subsample are shown in the third column 
of Table 2.   
As can be seen in the middle of the table, transition rates across various parts of the earned 
income distribution are fairly high.  In each of the samples, more than 20 percent of families 
move out of poverty (based on earnings) each year, while about one-quarter of families with an 
initial earned income-to-needs ratio between one and 1.5 fall into poverty in the following year.  
These numbers are suggestive of a sizable amount of idiosyncratic change in family incomes, and 
provide a baseline with which to compare the EITC or minimum wage effects we report later in 
the paper.  
Finally, the average federal EITC credit rate in our sample period was 14.8 percent for 
families with children, with the average size of an increase equalling 4.0 percentage points per 
year (using the numbers in column (2) of Table 2).  The average state supplement for those states 
with an EITC program was 4.8 percent, with the average increase equal to 1.5 percentage points 
per year.  The average real minimum wage was a bit less than $3 over our sample period, with the 
average real increase equal to $.20 per year.  
 10 
The Earned Income Tax Credit: effects on earned income 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of the EITC from the basic specifications shown in 
equations (1) and (2).  Each row of the table reports estimates from a single specification, with 
the first column showing the estimated effects of changes in the federal credit rate and the second 
column estimated effects of changes in the state supplements.  For the federal program, the credit 
rate is defined as the proportion of earned income that can be applied as a credit to an eligible 
family’s federal taxes over the phase-in range of the EITC; this variable thus varies across 
families based on the year in which they are in the sample and on the number of children in the 
family.  For the state programs, the variable is the supplement used to augment the federal credit 
as specified in states that also have an EITC program;
10 this variable also varies across years and 
with the number of dependent children in the family, but varies across states as well.  
There is perhaps some question as to whether the policy variable should be entered in 
levels or changes.  The motivation behind using changes is that a change in the policy (like an 
increase in the credit rate) generates a contemporaneous increase in the probability that poor 
families escape poverty, as some families now decide that employment is worthwhile for some 
member or members.  On the other hand, to the extent that there are always random shocks 
throwing some families into poverty, a higher level of the EITC could arguably be associated 
with faster transitions out of poverty.
11  As the choice of whether to use the level or change is 
readily testable in a nested framework, we let the data guide us in this respect.  In particular, the 
specification using levels of the credit rate and the p-values for the test of the restrictions implied 
by the change specification are shown in Appendix Table A1.  The statistical significance of the 
lagged value in many specifications argues against using only the contemporaneous level of the 
credit rate, and in no case were we able to reject the restriction implied by the specification using 
only the change in the credit rate; indeed for the state credit rate this restriction held remarkably 11 
closely.
12  Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we report results from specifications using 
changes in the EITC variables.
13   
Returning to Table 3, Panel I reports estimates of the effects of the EITC on the probability 
that a family with earned income below the poverty line in year one has an earned income level 
above the poverty line in year two.  As can be seen in the top row of the panel, the effect of the 
federal credit rate is negative, suggesting that increases in the EITC credit rate are associated with 
reductions in the rate of transition out of poverty, but the estimate is not statistically significant.  
One possible interpretation of a negative coefficient is that the EITC reduces work among low-
income families, reflecting a large income effect on labor supply.  Note, however, that because 
year effects are included in this specification, identification of the coefficient comes primarily 
from the correlation of changes in the federal EITC with differences in transition rates for 
families with no children and families with children.  And, because there are potentially other 
federal policies that have different effects on the incomes of families with and without children 
(e.g., AFDC or child care credits), this equation may be subject to specification bias.  We can get 
around some of the more obvious misspecifications by limiting the sample to families with 
children, thus identifying the coefficient from the differences in transition rates for families with 
one child and families with more than one child.  But as indicated in the second row, the 
coefficient for this subsample is more negative, although with a considerably larger standard 
error. 
A potentially more fruitful approach is to use state-year variation in the EITC program as a 
means of identifying the effects of the EITC on earned income.
14  The estimated coefficients of 
the state EITC variables are shown in the second column.  For the sample as a whole, the 
estimated state EITC effect on the transition rate out of poverty is positive but not statistically 
significant.  However, when the sample is restricted to include only families with children, the 
estimated EITC effect is larger and becomes significant.  This is, in fact, the sample for which 12 
one would expect to see sizable EITC effects, and, in our view, results in a cleaner control group 
than can be achieved with the entire sample. 
In the third row, we include year-children interaction terms in the specification to control 
for changes in other policies or economic changes that vary with the number of children in each 
family.  Upon including these interaction terms, only the effect of state EITCs is identified.  
Using this specification, the results are similar to those in the previous row, with the beneficial 
effects of the EITC on family earnings again showing up quite clearly.  Moreover, the size of the 
coefficient estimate indicates that the effect of the EITC on poverty rates is not negligible.  To 
make this readily apparent from the regression results, the EITC variables are standardized so that 
one-unit changes correspond to the average increases among observations for which an increase 
occurred (reported in Table 2).
15  These coefficients indicate that an average (.04) increase in the 
credit rate increases the probability that a poor family’s earnings rise above the poverty threshold 
by about .06.  Since the mean of this transition rate is .21 (Table 2), this is an increase of between 
one-quarter and one-third.   
We delve into the EITC effects further in Panel II, focusing in particular on changes in 
income-to-needs for families with earnings below the poverty line in year one (equation (2) 
above). The results for this specification are quite similar to those in Panel I.  Changes in the 
federal credit rate are estimated to reduce income-to-needs in both the full poor family sample 
and in the sample restricted to poor families with children, although the estimates are not 
statistically significant.  With respect to the state credit, the EITC has a positive and significant 
effect on income-to-needs in both samples, with the size of the coefficients indicating that an 
average (.04) increase in the credit rate raises the income-to-needs ratio among poor families by 
around .07 on average. 
In Panel III, we examine the possibility that the EITC increases or reduces the probability 
that a family’s earnings drop below the poverty line using a similar set of specifications.  In this 13 
set of results, we restrict the sample to families with earned income-to-needs ratios between one 
and 1.5.  In our sample period, the income level at which families are first entitled to the 
maximum EITC benefit almost always occurs at an income level that is below the poverty line for 
families with one or more children.
16   Thus, for these families theory predicts that a higher EITC 
will reduce labor supply.  Of course it is not the credit rate that is relevant to these families, but 
the maximum credit.  Historically, however, the maximum credit and the credit rate have always 
moved in the same direction, so to keep things consistent with the earlier specifications, we 
continue to look at the credit rate as a proxy for the generosity of the EITC.
17   
In general, there is little evidence that the EITC has any effect on the rate of transition from 
near-poor to poor.  For the federal credit, the coefficient estimates are in the direction of 
suggesting that the EITC increases the likelihood that families fall into poverty, although the 
estimated effects are again not statistically significant.  In addition, the coefficients on the state 
credit rate show essentially zero effect of the EITC on this transition rate.  
Panel IV of the table reports the effects of the EITC on changes in earned income-to-needs 
ratios for this same set of near-poor families.  As can be seen in the first column, changes in the 
federal credit rate are estimated to have negative effect on the income-to-needs ratio of near-poor 
families, with the estimated effect statistically significant for the sample as a whole but not for the 
subsample of families with children.  In contrast, and consistent with the results in Panel III, 
changes in the state credit rate are estimated to have little effect on income-to-needs for this group 
of families. 
In sum, the evidence from the federal and state experiments reported in Table 3 points in 
quite different directions.  For the federal credit rate, there is no evidence that the EITC increases 
earned income among poor families, a result that runs counter to the program’s intent.  In 
contrast, the coefficients on the state credit rate suggest strongly that the EITC raises earned 
income among poor families with children.  And, perhaps more importantly, families eligible for 14 
the EITC are more likely to see their earnings rise above the poverty line when the credit 
increases in generosity.
18  In the other direction, there is some evidence from the federal 
experiment that a higher EITC leads to a reduction in earned income among near-poor families, 
although this evidence is relatively weak.  For the state experiment, the evidence points to very 
little effect on families with earned income initially just above the poverty line.  Of course, all of 
these estimated coefficients understate the overall positive effects on income associated with the 
EITC.  That is, the increase in total resources would be more pronounced if one considered the 
additional income received from the credit itself, which is not taken into account in this 
analysis.
19    
To demonstrate the source of the differences in results more clearly, Figures 1 and 2 
present an analysis of the residuals from regressions of the EITC credit rate and poverty status in 
year two (conditional on poverty in year one) on the auxiliary variables in the basic specification.  
In particular, the upper-left panel of Figure 1 shows the yearly mean residuals of the change in the 
federal EITC credit rate for families with one child, while the upper-middle panel shows the 
yearly mean residuals for the changes in the federal credit rate for families with two or more 
children.  Comparing these two panels documents that the credit rate was increased by 
significantly different amounts in 1991 and 1994, with more minor differences in the intervening 
years (see Table 1); note that in all instances, the credit rate was increased by more for families 
with two children than for families with one child, resulting in the pattern of residuals shown in 
these panels.   
As it is relative movements in the one- and two-child credit rates that identify the EITC 
effect in the federal experiment, the estimated effect can be derived from the correlation of these 
residuals with those in the bottom panel, which are the mean residuals from the poverty status 
regression.  In particular, note that the relative movements in the credit rate in 1991 are negatively 
correlated with the transition rate residuals in that year, while the large relative change in the 15 
credit rates in 1994 are associated with residuals in the middle of the range.  As can be seen in the 
upper-right panel, these patterns, combined with those for the remaining years, result in a 
negative and imprecisely estimated EITC effect from the federal experiments. 
Figure 2, which shows similarly calculated residuals for the state treatment and control 
groups, indicates that there is significantly more variation in the relative movements in the credit 
rate in the state experiment, which probably helps to identify the EITC effect more accurately.  
As indicated in the upper-right panel, the mean residuals for changes in the credit rate and the 
transitions out of poverty are positively correlated in the state experiment, producing a positive 
estimate of the effect of the EITC on earned income-to-needs. 
Labor supply effects 
Although our sense is that using state variation in the EITC provides a cleaner experiment 
than does the federal credit, the differences in coefficient estimates associated with these two 
EITC variables raise important questions about what we have found.  To attempt to shed 
additional light on the results for income, we performed a complementary analysis of the effects 
of the EITC on employment and hours worked for our subsample of poor families with children.  
In general, the specifications are similar to those in Table 3, with the exception that the dependent 
variable is either the probability that a family added an adult worker in the second year they were 
in the sample, or the change in total hours supplied by adult family members between the first and 
second years. 
In Table 4, we estimate the effects of the EITC on the probability that a family adds an 
adult worker between year one and year two.  In Panel I, we first (in sub-panel A) limit the 
sample to those families that had no adults working in year one.  For both the federal and state 
EITC variables, the effects of the EITC show through quite clearly.  In particular, an average 
increase in the federal EITC is estimated to raise the probability of adding a worker in year two 
by .11, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the five-percent level.  The specifications 16 
using the state credit show a similarly-sized positive effect on employment, although it is 
estimated a bit less precisely.  The fact that we find positive employment effects for both credit 
rates suggests that the earlier negative effects on income found for the federal EITC specifications 
may have been spurious, possibly owing to correlations between the EITC and other federal 
programs that affected the incomes of poor families in a way that masked the benefits of the 
EITC, but did not have a corresponding effect on labor supply behavior. 
In sub-panel B, we restrict the sample to families that had one adult worker in year one to 
see if the employment effects extended to the working poor as well.  In general, there is little 
evidence of any EITC effect for this subgroup.  The estimated effect of the federal credit is 
positive, but imprecise.  For the state credit rate, there is weak evidence of a negative effect of the 
EITC on the probability that such families add another worker to the labor market.  Although this 
result is suggestive of a negative income effect on labor supply, the estimated coefficients are also 
statistically insignificant. 
In Panel II, we examine the effects of the EITC on total hours worked by adult family 
members, splitting the sample into those families with no adult workers in year one and those 
families with at least one adult worker initially.  As can be seen in sub-panel C, the federal EITC 
is estimated to have essentially no effect on hours worked by families with no adult workers 
initially.  This result seems surprising given the positive employment effects reported in the top 
panel, and again points to the inconsistent and potentially spurious results obtained for the federal 
EITC experiment.  In contrast, the estimated effects of the state credit rate show sizable positive 
effects on annual hours worked in families without an adult worker in the first year, which 
although only marginally significant, are consistent with the results for employment shown in the 
top panel.  The size of the hours change seems large at first glance, but given that it is associated 
with entry into the work force, it is consistent with the lumpy nature of employment.  For families 
with an adult worker in year one (sub-panel D of Panel II), there is a positive EITC effect using 17 
the federal credit rate as the explanatory variable, but the estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  The effect of increases in the state EITC credit rate, however, is to reduce hours 
worked for families that initially had at least one adult worker in year one.  These results are the 
clearest indication we have of the negative effect of the EITC on labor supply found by some 
previous researchers (e.g., Eissa and Hoynes, 1998).   
The results from Table 4 indicate more clearly the sources of the positive and negative 
effects from the EITC.  Increases in earnings mainly come about by inducing adult workers in 
families without an adult in the labor market to enter the labor market in order to take advantage 
of the credit.  In contrast, poor families that already have an adult working do not increase their 
hours and may reduce them in response to an increase in the credit rate.  This suggests that such 
families are likely to be operating on the flat portion of the EITC schedule, so that the negative 
influence of higher income on labor supply is the dominant consideration.  However, the evidence 
in Table 3 indicating no negative effects of increased generosity of the EITC on near-poor 
families differs somewhat in indicating that for these families there is little response to the EITC.  
This poses somewhat of a puzzle because the families for whom these effects are identified are 
more likely to be in the phase-out range, where the negative labor supply effects should be 
stronger.   
In Table 5, we attempt to match up our estimated effects of the EITC on income with the 
estimated labor supply effects reported in Table 4.  In particular, given that the effects on 
employment and hours worked are most pronounced for poor families with no adult workers in 
year one, we would expect to see the largest positive effects on earned income for these families. 
In contrast, the effects on earned income for poor families with an adult worker in year one 
should be minimal or even negative, as there is no evidence of a positive labor supply response 
for such families, and some evidence of an EITC-induced reduction in hours worked.   18 
For poor families with no adult workers in year one, the results in Table 5 generally 
conform to these expectations, at least for the coefficients on the state credit rate.  In particular, 
there are clear positive effects from the state credit rate on the probability that a poor family 
without a worker in year one becomes non-poor in year two (sub-panel A), as well as on the 
change in income-to-needs ratios (sub-panel C) for such families.  In contrast, the estimates show 
little effect of the federal EITC on the earned income of poor families with no adult worker in the 
first year, either in terms of the transition rate out of poverty or the income-to-needs ratio, despite 
the strong positive employment effect reported in Table 4. 
Turning to poor families with an adult worker in year one, the results in sub-panel B 
indicate little effect from either the federal or state EITC on the transition rate to above poverty-
level earnings, consistent with the lack of positive labor supply influences reported in Table 4.  
As indicated in sub-panel D, when the dependent variable is specified as the change in income-to-
needs, the coefficient estimates on the state EITC variable are positive, although not statistically 
significant.  Nevertheless, these positive or non-negative earnings effects are difficult to square 
with the EITC-induced reduction in hours worked for these families estimated in Table 4.  In part, 
it appears that some large changes in income-to-needs within this group account for the positive 
estimate in Panel D.  When we use the probability that a family experienced an increase in 
income-to-needs between year one and year two (Panel III), as a means of reducing the influence 
of extreme observations, the EITC coefficient estimates for the sample of poor families with no 
adult worker in year one are similar to those in Panel II (although less precisely estimated), while 
the coefficient estimates for the sample of poor families with an adult worker in year one become 
small and negative; the failure to find stronger negative effects despite the negative labor supply 
effects for this group is nonetheless puzzling. 
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Robustness and validity checks 
  The next two tables assess the robustness and validity of the estimated effects of the EITC 
on income-to-needs by varying the specification and sample used in the analysis.  In Table 6, we 
vary the threshold across which we measure transitions to test the sensitivity of our results to this 
rather arbitrary specification choice.  There are two reasons to look at evidence for earned 
income-to-needs thresholds below one.  First, given our findings that the EITC effects are largest 
for families without an adult worker (and thus little if any earned income) in year one, we might 
expect to see stronger effects when we set the threshold at a lower level.  For example, a family in 
which a worker enters the labor market at a minimum wage job is unlikely to attain poverty-level 
earnings in the subsequent year (more so if there are children or the job is part-time).  In this case, 
our choice of one for the earned income-to-needs cutoff in previous specifications would miss 
some of the beneficial effects of the EITC.  Second, as already noted, we do not measure all 
components of income used to classify families as poor or non-poor, so that families attaining a 
lower fraction of the poverty threshold in terms of earnings alone might nonetheless escape 
poverty.   
  The results in the table are suggestive of some sensitivity to the choice of threshold, at least 
for families with no adult worker in year one (sub-panel B).  In particular, the state EITC effects 
are strongest for this subsample when the threshold is set at .3, indicating that some families’ 
earned income-to-needs are lifted by the EITC, although not to a ratio above the poverty line.  
This suggests that our previous estimates focusing on the transition out of poverty may understate 
the beneficial effects of the EITC on earnings of low-income families.  Of course, some families 
seem to be helped even more by the EITC, as is indicated by the positive coefficients for all of the 
income thresholds in the table.  Consistent with the results reported in Table 5, the estimated 
effect of the federal EITC is small and negative for poor families with no adult worker in year 
one, a result that is insensitive to the choice of threshold.  Similarly, for poor families with an 20 
adult worker in year one, our earlier finding of essentially no effect of the EITC on poverty 
transitions is not affected by the choice of income-to-needs threshold. 
  In Table 7, we repeat the analysis in Table 3 for both the effects of the EITC on transition 
rates to above poverty-level earnings and on changes in income-to-needs, but introducing a 
variety of other differences in the sample or specification.  In Panels A and B, we vary our 
treatment of states offering only non-refundable tax credits at the state level, on the grounds that 
refundability is often touted as a major feature contributing to the value of the program to low-
income families. In particular, if refundability is important to a family’s labor supply decisions, 
the estimated EITC effects should be larger for the lowest-income families once the credit for 
states without refundable credits is downgraded or when these states are dropped.
20 
When the states with non-refundable credits are excluded from the sample (Panel A), the 
estimated effects of the state EITC on transitions out of poverty for this subsample are smaller 
than the baseline results, rather than larger, and no longer statistically significant.  However, the 
effect of the state EITC on the change in income-to-needs is still significant when these states are 
excluded and is nearly identical to the baseline results.  As an alternative, we attempt to equate 
the effective rate of refundable and non-refundable credits, setting the credit rate for the latter 
equal to one-fifth of the statutory rate.  The choice of one-fifth as the equivalent rate for non-
refundable credits is based on the “trade-off” between refundable and non-refundable rates 
established in Maryland in 1998, when taxpayers were offered an option of a 50-percent non-
refundable supplement or a 10-percent refundable supplement.  However, we obtain essentially 
the same results when we do this, as reported in Panel B.  In no case is there any meaningful 
change to the federal or state EITC coefficients.   
In Panels C and D, we alter the set of control variables used in the analysis.  In Panel C, we 
drop the change in the unemployment rate, on the grounds that it is potentially endogenous to 
changes in the EITC (if, for example, the EITC raises household spending).  The drawback to this 21 
change in specification is the absence of controls for state labor market influences on poverty 
rates.  In any event, there is little change in any of the EITC parameter estimates when the 
unemployment rate is omitted, perhaps because much of the variation in economic conditions is 
aggregate variation captured by the year effects.  In Panel D, we add controls for changes in real 
AFDC benefits for a family of three, and in the extent to which state welfare laws could differ 
from federal regulations (federal waivers).  The results are very similar when these controls are 
added, consistent with our earlier argument that the specifications using the state credit rate are 
less susceptible to biases associated with the omission of other state policies.   
In Panel E, we use changes in the maximum credit rather than the phase-in rate as the EITC 
policy variable.  The rationale for this alternative is that the change in the phase-in rate does not 
always provide a complete description of changes in the EITC program.  In particular, using the 
maximum credit also captures changes in the phase-in range, and thus may pick up some 
variation omitted by the credit variable.  As it turns out−perhaps not surprisingly given that the 
changes in the maximum credit and the phase-in rate are highly correlated in our 
sample−substituting the change in the maximum credit as the EITC policy variable has little 
qualitative effect on the results.  In particular, for the federal EITC, the coefficients are still 
negative and insignificant.  For the state EITC, the estimated effect is somewhat smaller than the 
baseline results (as before, for average policy changes), but the coefficients continue to indicate 
positive and statistically significant effects of the EITC on both the transition rate out of poverty 
and on the change in income-to-needs. 
The next three panels investigate the effects of using alternative treatment and control 
groups in the analysis.  In Panel F, we limit the control group to states that have a geographical 
border with the states that have their own EITC program.  The idea here is that bordering states 
will be more similar in other ways to the EITC states and thus form a better control group.  For 
the state EITC phase-in rate, there is little change in the coefficient estimates.  For the federal 22 
EITC, the estimated effect is still negative, but is substantially larger than in the baseline, and is 
statistically significant.  In Panels G and H, we omit the states with the largest changes in credit 
rates from the sample to test the sensitivity of the estimated EITC effects to these policy outliers.  
In Panel G, we drop all observations on families from Wisconsin with three or more children, for 
whom the phase-in rate was very high beginning in 1989.  In Panel H, we omit observations from 
Maryland, which introduced a large non-refundable credit in 1987.  In neither case does the 
change in sample have much effect on either the federal or state EITC coefficient estimates.
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  Finally, in Panels I and J, we examine the possibility that the results we report for the EITC 
in earlier tables are spurious, by looking for positive EITC effects in samples of families not 
eligible to participate in the program.  In Panel I, we apply our methodology to families that have 
earned income-to-needs ratios between zero and three, but that do not have any children and thus 
would not be eligible for the EITC prior to 1994.  In particular, we estimate specifications like 
those in Table 3 for this sample of currently childless families, but attach the EITC parameters 
that would have been relevant to them if they had three or more children.  If the effects we have 
attributed to the EITC were actually associated with an omitted variable that also boosted earned 
income and that was correlated with the EITC, then we might expect to see spurious “EITC 
effects” for this ineligible population as well.  For both the federal and state EITC variables, the 
estimated coefficients are very small and insignificant.  In Panel J, we perform the same analysis 
on a sample of families with income-to-needs between three and 10, well above the qualifying 
cut-off for the EITC.  Again, the resulting coefficient estimates are small and insignificant, 
indicating no effect of the EITC on this group of families.  As we should not expect to see EITC 
effects for these particular samples, these results add credence to our interpretation of the results 
in Table 3 as reflecting causal effects of the EITC.  
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The EITC versus the minimum wage 
In Table 8, we report estimates from specifications that include both the EITC variables 
and the minimum wage, to see if conditioning on minimum wage changes alters the estimated 
EITC effects on earned income, and to provide a more direct contrast of the effects of the 
alternative policies for the same population.  As it turns out, there is a relatively low correlation 
coefficient (less than .15) between changes in minimum wages and changes in EITC parameters, 
and thus adding the minimum wage changes to the specification has little effect on the estimates 
of the EITC effects.  As already noted, we scale the EITC variables to measure the effects of 
average policy increases in the federal credit rate over the sample period.  Similarly, we scale the 
minimum wage variable to measure the effects of average real increases in the minimum wage 
over the same period.
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In Panel I, we report estimates of the effects of the two policies on transition rates from 
below poverty to above poverty-level earnings.  Looking first at the results for the full sample 
(sub-panel A), as can be seen in the first row, for the entire sample of poor families we again find 
no evidence that the federal EITC raises earned income-to-needs, and only weak evidence that the 
state EITC has a positive effect.  In addition, the minimum wage is estimated to have essentially 
no effect on the transition rate, consistent with the evidence reported in Neumark and Wascher 
(1997).
23  When the sample is restricted to families with children, however, both the state EITC 
and the minimum wage are estimated to have a positive influence on earnings.  The EITC effect 
is more than twice as large as the minimum wage effect, pointing to the greater effectiveness of 
the EITC in raising earnings, at least for the types of changes in policy enacted during our sample 
period.
24  Moreover, the difference in minimum wage effects between families with and without 
children is suggestive of an offsetting negative effect on earnings of families without children. 
The remainder of Panel I reports results conditioning on the presence of an adult worker in 
the family initially, which, as documented in earlier tables, was strongly associated with the 24 
effects of the EITC.  In sub-panel B, we report results for families with no adult worker in year 
one.  As before, we find stronger positive effects of the EITC on the probability of a transition to 
above poverty-level earnings.  In contrast, the minimum wage effects are weaker, with the 
contemporaneous effect, in particular, becoming smaller and statistically insignificant.  In sub-
panel C, we report estimates for families with at least one adult worker in year one.  Here there 
are no significant positive effects of the EITC, but the positive effects of the minimum wage are 
considerably larger.  This evidence is consistent with the EITC doing much more to help families 
with no adult worker initially, while the benefits of the minimum wage fall more strongly on 
those families−with children−that have adult workers.
25  
In Panel II, we repeat the analysis using changes in income-to-needs as the dependent 
variable.  Qualitatively, the results are similar to those in Panel I.  The federal EITC has either a 
negative or no discernible effect on income-to-needs ratios among poor families; the state EITC 
has a positive effect on income-to-needs, especially for the subsample of poor families with 
children; and the minimum wage has a modest positive effect on earnings of poor families with 
children, but no effect for the sample of poor families as a whole.  Similarly, disaggregating by 
the presence of adult workers in the initial year again reveals that the benefits of the EITC fall 
largely on families with no adult workers initially, while the minimum wage benefits families 
with adult workers.   
Conclusions 
  This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the earned income tax credit in raising the 
earnings of poor and low-income families.  In particular, we move beyond the simulation 
approach commonly used in the literature and provide reduced-form estimates using two-year 
panels of families derived from matched CPS files, focusing on the probability that an initially 
poor family sees its earned income rise above the poverty line, and on the changes in income-to-
needs that such families experience, as a result of increased generosity of the EITC. 25 
  The results of our estimation strategy hinge on the nature of the experiment we perform.  In 
particular, when we look at the federal EITC, identifying its effects from differences in the credit 
rate by family size, we either find that the EITC reduces the probability that a poor family escapes 
poverty or, in our preferred specifications, find no statistically significant effect.  In contrast, 
when we focus on state credit rates, thus using state variation to identify the EITC effects, we find 
evidence that the EITC helps families rise above poverty-level earnings.  Neither experiment 
points to any effect of the EITC on families initially above the poverty line, suggesting that the 
EITC is well targeted.  We find a similar pattern of results when we use changes in income-to-
needs as the dependent variable.   
  The difference between the estimated effects on earned income using the federal or state 
credit rate is explored further by examining the effects of the EITC on family labor supply.  In 
general, the results based on the state credit rate form a more consistent whole, pointing to a 
positive labor supply effect for the same sets of families for which we estimate a positive effect 
on earned income.  In contrast, the results based on the federal credit rate are difficult to interpret 
in a consistent fashion, raising the possibility that our federal EITC estimates are being 
contaminated by spurious influences, perhaps stemming from the small amount of variation that 
identifies the federal experiment, and/or underlying differences in trends for families of different 
sizes.  In particular, one possibility is that other federal policies are changing over this period in a 
way that limits the extent to which variation in the number of children in a family can identify the 
EITC effect.   
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a) provide a detailed discussion of a wide array of such policy 
changes, in particular those focused on increasing work incentives for single mothers.  These 
include changes in income taxes, AFDC and Food Stamp benefits, Medicaid, training programs, 
child care programs, and private health insurance.  They also provide rather compelling evidence 
that−as a whole−the time-series pattern of changes in work among single mothers is consistent 26 
with these policy changes having sharply boosted employment of single mothers.  To the extent 
that such policy changes induce different patterns of employment change in families with and 
without children, as well as in families with different numbers of children, isolating the effects of 
the EITC may require using specifications that allow for different trends over time for families 
with different numbers of children (i.e., year × children interactions).
26  As only the state EITC 
experiment is identified in such specifications, this explanation is an argument in favor of  our 
state experiment for estimating the effects of the EITC on earnings, and is consistent with our 
evidence that only the state EITCs yield a set of results broadly consistent with theoretical 
predictions.   
The labor supply estimates we report also indicate more clearly the channels through which 
the EITC operates.  In particular, there is strong evidence that the EITC raises earnings by 
inducing labor market entry among families that initially do not have any adults in the work 
force.  In contrast, we find some evidence that increasing the EITC credit rate reduces hours 
among poor families that already have a working adult, thus offsetting the additional (post-tax) 
earnings associated with the more generous credit.  Thus, our estimates are consistent with both 
alternatives found in the literature−notably the positive labor supply effect for single mothers 
(many of whom would not have been in the work force initially) and the negative overall labor 
supply effect for married couples (at least one of whom may initially have been an earner).   
Finally, our results suggest that for the range of policy changes that have been typical in 
recent years, the EITC is more beneficial for poor families than is the minimum wage.  The 
minimum wage appears to have some positive effect on the earnings of families with children.  
But our estimates of the effects of the EITC are much larger than for the minimum wage.  Our 
evidence also highlights the different types of families that the alternative policies are likely to 
benefit, indicating that a higher minimum wage helps families with adults in the work force, 
while increased generosity of the EITC primarily benefits families that initially have no adult 27 
workers, an empirical result that follows quite expectedly from the theoretical prediction that the 
EITC will encourage labor market entry.   
  The fact that the EITC appears to increase earnings is a particularly strong statement in 
favor of such a policy.  For one thing, our analysis does not include the income benefits of the tax 
credit itself, and thus we understate the overall effects of the EITC on the total income of eligible 
families.  Moreover, if the EITC were simply to increase total income rather than earnings, it 
would be just another tax and transfer scheme, similar to those that have consistently 
disappointed policy makers in the past, presumably because the EITC would not provide longer-
run beneficial effects stemming from increased attachment to the labor market.  In this sense, 
evidence that the EITC raises labor force participation and earnings among the poorest families 
suggests that it may also have a positive influence by encouraging economic self-sufficiency 
among the poor, which would enhance its effectiveness as a policy for fighting poverty, and−we 
suspect−its political support. 
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1 Blank, et al. (1999) suggest that policy makers also attempt to use such programs to encourage 
longer-run economic self-sufficiency.  This stated objective might help to explain the interest in 
the labor market effects of income-support programs, although it does not explain the dearth of 
research on their effects on income.  Of course, one could argue that if there are no effects of the 
EITC on wages (which theory predicts might fall), then studying labor supply effects is sufficient 
to gauge income effects.  Strictly speaking, this is true, as long as we can look at labor supply of 
all family members, weighted by the wages of each person.  Studying family income directly is 
less demanding of the data, and of course we should not necessarily rule out wage effects of the 
EITC. 
2 Another alternative is to focus on the effects of the EITC on consumption, as is done in Romich 
and Weisner (1999), Smeeding, et al. (1999), and Barrow and McGranahan (1999).   
3 We have chosen to cut off the sample at this point for two reasons.   First, we wanted to avoid 
potential complications associated with welfare reform.  In particular, the introduction of TANF 
in 1996 and the corresponding proliferation of state experiments would likely make it difficult to 
distinguish EITC effects from those of other policies.  Second, because of CPS sample redesign, 
data from June ‘94-August ‘95 cannot be matched forward, so we cannot use the March 1995-
March 1996 match. 
4 When reporting descriptive statistics we use weights designed to reduce bias associated with 
differential match rates.  Specifically, we retained the family-specific sampling weight from the 
CPS and adjusted by an estimate of the probability of a successful match derived from a logistic 
regression of matching success on the age of the family head and the initial income-to-needs 
ratio.  The resulting weight is an estimate of the inverse of the probability of being in our matched 
sample of families.  Although the regression estimates we report are unweighted, the results were 
not qualitatively affected by weighting.   
5 In our sample, the correlation between the changes in the credit rate and the maximum credit is 
0.98, which is not surprising since they are closely related by construction.  When we estimated 
specifications using the change in the maximum credit in place of the change in the credit rate, 
the results were very similar to those shown here; limited results using this alternative measure 
are reported below.  
6 See Council of Economic Advisers (1997) for additional information on how these variables 
were constructed. 
7 Pist is typically a vector, including, for example, changes in federal and state EITC parameters.  
8 In estimating equation (1), we found that the estimated standard errors of the state EITC 
variables are smaller when fixed state and year effects are included.  This implies that the 
inclusion of these variables reduces the residual variance by an amount sufficient to outweigh the  
 
loss of information that including such fixed effects usually entails.  In such a case, the fixed 
effects should obviously be included.  
9 Indeed, prior to 1994, families with no children were not eligible for the EITC.  Henceforth, we 
simply refer to families with and without children under 18 as those with and without children.  
10 With the federal rate denoted rf, and the state rate denoted rs (defined as zero in states without 
an EITC), the combined rate (rc) is rc = rf⋅(1+rs).  The federal EITC is calculated as rf multiplied 
by income (Y), over the phase-in range.  The state EITC is then equal to rs multiplied by the 
federal EITC, or rs⋅(rf⋅Y) (see, e.g., Johnson and Lazere, 1999).  We therefore use rf as the federal 
rate, and rs⋅rf as the state rate. 
11 One potential drawback of using the level of the EITC in equation (1) is that, unless for some 
reason a higher EITC also increased the rate of transition into poverty, the eventual implication of 
a permanent increase in the transition rate out of poverty would be to eliminate poverty 
altogether. 
12 For the federal credit rate, the estimates of coefficients on the lagged level were very imprecise, 
as this variable has far less variation given that the sample period ends in 1994.   
13 We also estimated specifications in which we added the second lag (in levels) to the 
specification with current and lagged levels.  The second lag was always insignificant, whether 
tested jointly (federal and state) or separately. 
14 This is, of course, subject to some of the same concerns as the federal credit, in that there may 
be state-specific policies coming into play at the same time that have differing income effects on 
families with different numbers of children.  However, we suspect that this is less of a problem 
across states than it is for the federal EITC; moreover, the additional variation in the data allows 
us to include additional interactions to control for some of these possible effects.  The drawback 
of this approach is that relatively few states have a separate EITC.  This raises the possibility that 
the estimates are being driven by one or two states, an issue to which we return later in the paper. 
15 We use the average change in the federal EITC rate for both federal and state EITC variables 
since we are trying to estimate the effect of a single policy, although we have two different 
experiments with which to do this.  The choice of scale has no effect on the statistical inferences, 
of course.  
16 For only a small handful of near-poor families (1.7 percent) did the poverty line climb above 
the maximum credit in year 2, by an average of only $160 (nominal).   
17 The phase-out rate and the length of the credit plateau (i.e., the range of earnings over which 
the maximum credit is earned) can also affect labor supply.  Since 1987, increases in the credit 
rate have always been associated with increases in the phase-out rate, which should reduce labor 
supply, but the length of the plateau has also increased with the credit rate, which could exert a 
slight positive influence on labor supply as families move to a higher kink point.  In any event, 
we verified that the empirical results for the near-poor are similar using the change in the 
maximum credit as the policy variable. 
18 For the specifications for transitions to above poverty-level earnings, and for changes in 
income-to-needs for families below poverty-level earnings, we tested the restriction that the state 
and federal effects were equal.  This was rejected at the 5-percent level.  
19 Information on the actual credit received is not available in the CPS.  
 
20 For our sample period, excluding families only eligible for non-refundable credits means 
dropping all observations for Maryland, Iowa, and Rhode Island.    
21 There were also sizable expansions in Medicaid in Wisconsin in both 1988 and 1992, which 
may confound the estimated effects of the EITC.  We verified that the results were qualitatively 
similar omitting the Wisconsin observations altogether, although remaining statistically 
significant only for the change in income-to-needs. 
22 Whether we use federal increases only or federal and state increases is irrelevant, as the former 
is .209, and the latter .204.  (These are real increases in 1982-1984 dollars; see Table 2.)     
23 In that paper, we find that minimum wages have a slight positive effect on the probability of 
escaping poverty (defined in terms of total income), and a larger positive effect on the probability 
of slipping into poverty. 
24 One could contemplate policy changes of very different magnitudes, and in principle come up 
with a comparison as favorable to one policy or the other as one would like.  However, the 
dangers of extrapolating regression results well beyond the range of changes in the exogenous 
variables that occur in the sample are well-known, and it is plausible that the effects of policy 
changes of very different magnitudes differ substantially.  For example, many of those who argue 
that minimum wage increases do not reduce employment of low-wage workers qualify their 
conclusions to refer to small changes.  It is because of these considerations that we express our 
results in terms of the sample average policy changes. 
25 The latter result is not surprising.  While job loss from minimum wage increases may entail 
some “losers,” the winners are relatively more likely to be those with jobs already.  Of course, 
given relatively high turnover among low-wage workers, some of those without jobs initially may 
benefit by entering the labor market at higher wages. 
26 Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) carry out a multivariate analysis of the effects of the EITC (and 
income tax rates) on the labor supply of single women, in light of other accompanying policy 
changes.  Echoing our concerns, they add interactions between years and number of children to 
their specifications.  Because they look at the EITC and income taxes combined, use simulated 
tax/EITC payments, and focus on single women, the results are not directly comparable to ours.    